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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

never contacted the Corps.
Michigan Peat filed for declaratory relief in federal court against
the EPA and the State of Michigan. The district court dismissed the
action against the EPA for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It also
dismissed the action against the state defendants on the ground that
the Eleventh Amendment barred suit. The appellate court identified
two main issues in the case: (1) whether the EPA committed a final
agency action allowing suit against it; and (2) whether Michigan
waived immunity under the Eleventh Amendment by volunteering to
enter the section 404 permitting program of the CWA.
A court may only review final agency actions. The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that the draft permit was a final agency action because the
EPA withdrew objections and agreed to the proposed permit. It did
not matter that Michigan Peat did not sign the draft because statutorily
there was nothing left for the EPA to do. Therefore, the court of
appeals reversed, holding the district court erred in dismissing
Michigan Peat's action against the federal defendants.
The court also held that Congress did not abrogate state immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment by enacting the CWA act because the
only authority under which Congress can waive this immunity is under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress promulgated the
CWA under Article I powers. Therefore, Congress did not intend to
eliminate state immunity under the CWA. As a result, the court
reasoned that Michigan did not waive its immunity to federal suit by
volunteering in the section 404 program.
Kristen L. Cassisa

EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Armstrong v. Asarco, Inc., 138 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
plaintiff of citizen suit was prevailing party and entitled to limited
attorney's fees for actions reasonably related to results obtained after
polluter settled with government authorities following commencement
of citizen suit under Clean Water Act).
ASARCO began operating a lead refinery on the Missouri River in
the 1870s and discharged wastewater containing lead and other
pollutants directly into the river. As required by the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality
("NDEQ"), ASARCO filed an application for National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permit in 1982. Ten years later, NDEQ
had still not decided ASARCO's application, so it held a public hearing
regarding the pending application in 1993. In January 1994, after
receiving information regarding the facility under the Freedom of
Information Act, two citizens sent ASARCO a sixty day notice of intent
to sue required under the CWA and then filed suit on March 15, 1994.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

The EPA filed a similar suit on March 30, 1994. The two lawsuits were
consolidated.
After a consent decree failed in district court, ASARCO responded
to the plaintiff citizens' discovery requests by releasing a monitoring
report that showed a significant increase of wastewater and lead
discharged into the river. The citizens sought to preliminarily enjoin
ASARCO'S refinery operation. On June 28, 1995, one day before the
scheduled hearing, the EPA lodged another consent decree with the
district court. After public comment, the EPA and ASARCO moved
for the district court to enter the consent decree as a final judgment
on October 3, 1995. The citizens opposed the motion on the ground
that the decree failed to adequately address ASARCO's violations. The
district court granted the EPA's motion and entered a final judgment.
The court never entered judgment on the preliminary injunction
motion.
The district court awarded the citizens attorney's fees and expenses
pursuant to the CWA. On appeal, ASARCO argued that they should
not receive fees because they did not succeed on the merits,
emphasizing that the district court never ruled on the preliminary
injunction motion. ASARCO also argued that the citizens subverted
the goals of the CWA when they disagreed with and pursued goals
contrary to the EPA's position.
The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the legal question of
whether the citizens were prevailing parties. The court held that when
a polluter settles with government authorities following the
commencement of a citizen suit, a court may infer that the citizen suit
motivated the settlement, thereby making the citizens the prevailing
In this case, the citizens were catalysts to ASARCO's
party.
remediation efforts and eventual settlement with the EPA. The court
concluded the citizens were entitled to litigation costs related to the
motion for preliminary injunction because the costs reasonably related
to the results obtained. Even though the district court never ruled on
the citizens' motion, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the motion
promoted the success of the consent decree between the EPA and
ASARCO.
The court affirmed the district court's award of litigation costs
pursuant to the CWA, but reversed and remanded the award of any
litigation costs after June 30, 1995 related to the motion for a
preliminary injunction. The court also reversed and remanded any
award of litigation costs after June 28, 1995 in connection with the
consent decree because such work was not reasonably related to the
results obtained. Thus, the court only awarded costs as they related to
the motion for the preliminary injunction through completion of the
hearing.
M. Elizabeth Lokey

